Strauss on the Relationship between Philosophy and Revealed Law

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In the name of God, the Lord of Mercy, the Giver of Mercy

Often in the Western academy, the history of political philosophy starts with Plato & Aristotle, Christianity is philosophized in the classical era, and then comes the Enlightenment. However, the prevalent narrative in the field, such as that in Sheldon Wollin’s Politics and Vision (a classic in the field), is incomplete. Strauss corrects this narrative. The prevalent narrative ignores the role played by Muslims who translated, preserved, and brought back to life the works of Greek thinkers, namely Plato & Aristotle. It is under the Muslims that the Jews in Al-Andalus had their golden age. Without Al-Farabi, there would be no Maimonides. Without the likes of Averroes, Farabi, Maimonides, etc., philosophy would not be what it is today. In this regard, Strauss’ intervention is valuable.

Below is a summary of the key points in the second chapter of Leo Strauss’ Philosophy and Law: Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and his Predecessors. The second chapter of his work is titled “The Legal Foundation of Philosophy: The Commandment to Philosophize and the Freedom of Philosophizing.”

Across both Islamic and Judaic traditions, Strauss demonstrated in his work that the philosophy is subservient to revelatory law. To make his case, Strauss presented three figures, all of whom are in agreement that philosophy holds a status of bondage under revelation — the differences are in the specifics of this form of bondage. In the words of Strauss, the revealed law is the “pre-philosophic premise” by which philosophy’s contours and limits are defined. Since the question of philosophy is premised by revealed law, the following inquiry naturally arises: what is the legal ruling on philosophizing?

The first of these three figures is Averroes. In his Decisive Treatise, Averroes attempted to “determine the connection that exists between the law and philosophy.” To Averroes, philosophy is what allows one to understand how created beings relate to their maker. Averroes begins by raising the following questions: Is philosophy forbidden, permitted, or commanded by the revealed law? This very formulation stems from the Islamic legal tradition, thus reinforcing the notion that philosophy is subservient to the law. In his treatise, Averroes cites various verses from the Quran to substantiate the claim that philosophy is in fact commanded by the law. It is made clear in his work, that philosophy is not just one command of many — the ends of philosophy are in-line with the ends of the law. The end of the law is happiness, and happiness lies in the knowledge of God. The knowledge of God is arrived at through understanding how the creation relates to the creator. This very exercise in Averroes’ eyes is none other than philosophy.

Maimonides was similar to Averroes — in his model philosophy was also subservient to the law. In his view, the insufficiency of human intellect was substantiated by the fact that the human being cannot answer the question of whether the world was created or is eternal — to him the answer already lies in revelation. Averroes’s stance does not seem to be as humble and cautious as that of Maimonides. Averroes affirms the sufficiency of the human intellect, and as such calls for interpretation when reason seems to clash with revelation.

In Strauss’ assessment, Gersonides takes the middle path between the two aforementioned figures on the question of the sufficiency, or lack thereof, of the human intellect. Gersonides objects to Maimonides’ reasoning for the insufficiency of the intellect. To Gersonides, the longing to ascertain the answer on the created or eternal nature of the world is natural. In his view, a natural proclivity could not be directed at something that is unattainable. What was a cause for caution in the thinking of in Maimonides, was the cause for Gersonides to believe that answering such a question is possible. Although I did mention it earlier, both Averroes and Maimonides were of the view that philosophy should be kept away from those who are not fit to engage in such an endeavor — Gersonides had no such qualms. To him, philosophy was to be communicated to all. This seems to indicate that he did not seem to have the same level of concern for the law as the other two. Having said that, Gersonides still had his own set of limitations on philosophy.

To conclude, despite the differences amongst these three medieval philosophers on the topic (I did not discuss all of their differences), they all were on the same page with regard to philosophy’s overall relationship to the revealed law. There is no dispute over the primacy of the law — philosophy’s role is that of subservience to the revealed law.

For those interested in further readings on the question of reason and revelation, I suggest the following readings.

• Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation: A Study of Darʾ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa-l naql by Carl Sharif El-Tobgui, https://brill.com/view/title/55796?language=en
• Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought: The Taymiyyan Moment by Ovamir Anjum, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/politics-law-and-community-in-islamic-thought/F1EBEDCEDA7EFFD33BA9AE2CEF8A7CE8

It is fair to assume I have a soft spot for how Ibn Taymiyya addresses the supposed clash between reason & revelation and the sufficiency of the human intellect. Also, I am no fan of the philosopher’s noble lie. In my view, it is not in spirit with the manner in which revelation was sent down to us — its true depths accessible to creation from all walks of life.